The neurocognitive processing of environmental sounds and linguistic stimuli shares common semantic resources and can lead to the activation of motor programs for the generation of the passively heard sound or speech. We investigated the extent to which the cognition of environmental sounds, like that of language, relies on symbolic mental representations independent of the acoustic input. In a hierarchical sorting task, we found that evaluation of nonliving sounds is consistently biased toward a focus on acoustical information. However, the evaluation of living sounds focuses spontaneously on sound-independent semantic information, but can rely on acoustical information after exposure to a context consisting of nonliving sounds. We interpret these results as support for a robust iconic processing strategy for nonliving sounds and a flexible symbolic processing strategy for living sounds.
Introduction
Environmental sounds (ES from now on) have meaning by virtue of their connection with the events and objects that generated them (e.g., the sound of footsteps, Ballas & Howard, 1987) . Research on human processing of ES has frequently revealed similarities with the processing of linguistic materials from a variety of perspectives: psychophysical (e.g., Ballas & Mullins, 1991; Gygi, Kidd, & Watson, 2004 ), neuropsychological (e.g., Saygin, Dick, Wilson, Dronkers, & Bates, 2003 ), and psychobiological (e.g., Noppeney, Josephs, Hocking, Price, & Friston, 2008 Thierry, Giraud, & Price, 2003) . These similarities have recently been studied for a specific category of sounds: those generated by human actions (e.g., Galati et al., 2008; Pizzamiglio et al., 2005) . Accordingly, the processing of both linguistic materials and action sounds includes an activation of the motor programs that could generate the sound, i.e., involves sensorimotor transformations (e.g., Lewis, 2006; Pizzamiglio et al., 2005; Pulvermüller, 2005; Wilson, Sereno, & Iacoboni, 2004 ). In the current study, we adopted a behavioral approach to quantify category specific differences in the similarity between the linguistic and nonlinguistic auditory domains. To do so, we focused on another fundamental property of language processing: the activation of mental contents arbitrarily connected with the sensory input, i.e., symbolism (cf., Bickerton, 2005; Deacon, 1997) .
A basic difference between words and ES stands in their relationship to the referent (Ballas & Howard, 1987; Cummings et al., 2006; Dick et al., 2007; Saygin, Dick, & Bates, 2005) . The acoustics of ES is determined by the mechanical properties of the sound source (e.g., sounds generated by small objects tend to have a higher pitch, Fletcher & Rossing, 1991) . Because of this deterministic link, ES bear a similarity with the objects and actions at the sound source. As such, they tend to be icons of their referent (cf. Peirce, Houser, & Kloesel, 1998, p. 13) . On the contrary, the word-referent relation is often arbitrary. A word is thus a symbol for its referent because the sensory input bears no resemblance to the mental representations of the message recipient (cf. Peirce et al., 1998, p. 9) . Despite this basic difference, empirical investigations have frequently revealed an overlap in the neurocognitive resources dedicated to meaningful verbal and nonverbal auditory materials. A first piece of evidence in support of this notion is related to hemispheric asymmetries. ES are known to activate a large bilateral network of cortical areas, comprising the primary auditory, nonprimary temporal, and frontal cortices (e.g., Dick et al., 2007; Lewis, Phinney, Brefczynski-Lewis, & DeYoe, 2006) . Consistently, right-and left-hemispheric lesions equally disrupt performance in a task matching pictures to sounds (Schnider, Benson, Alexander, & Schnider-Klaus, 1994) . Nonetheless, rightand left-hemisphere lesions increase the rate of errors based on acoustical and semantic similarity, respectively (e.g., a crying baby sound is paired with the picture of a cat or with that of a laughing baby after right-and left-hemispheric damage, respectively, Faglioni, Spinnler, & Vignolo, 1969; Schnider et al., 1994; Spinnler & Vignolo, 1966; Vignolo, 1982) . Further, unrecognizable and recognizable sounds trigger stronger left-and right-lateralized activations, respectively (e.g., Lebrun et al., 2001; Thierry & Price, 2006 
